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Abstract
This dialogue took place at Va¨xjo¨, 19 November 2001. The main
aim of our meeting in Va¨xjo¨ was to clarify our viewpoints on founda-
tions of quantummechanics. The most attractive in our discussion was
the extreme difference in our quantum experiences. On one side, pure
mathematician (specializing in foundations of probability theory), An-
drei Khrennikov; on the other side, pure experimenter (specializing in
neutron and electron interferometry), Johann Summhammer. On one
hand, an attempt to test mathematical models for larger and larger
domains of physical reality. On the other hand, an attempt to create
this reality from experimental information - roughly speaking from
clicks of detectors.
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Andrei: Was the transition from classical to quantum physics a
jump-like transition that changed the whole picture of physical reality
or just a new application of ”classical” statistical physics?
Johann: It was a crucial change of the whole physical ideology.
In any case it was not just a new application of classical statistical
physics.
Andrei: What are the main distinguishing features of quantum
physics?
Johann: I would like to underline two new fundamental features:
(D) Discreteness of quantum observations and finiteness of infor-
mation that could be obtained via a concrete measurement. In mod-
ern language it would be that in finite time only a finite amount of
information can be obtained.
(R) Randomness of results of measurements.
Andrei: In fact, I do not see so large difference from classical sta-
tistical mechanics. Well, discreteness is the additional condition. But
it is natural from the experimentalist viewpoint: a finite precision of
each concrete measurement. This problem was deeply investigated al-
ready in 19th century: precision, errors and so on. Regarding to (R):
I do not see any difference with ”classical” statistical physics at all.
Already in statistical mechanics we calculate probabilities and aver-
ages. It looks that quantum mechanics is just a new domain (it might
be very special) of applications of ”classical” statistical physics.
Johann: Not at all! First I shall try to explain the role of (D) and
then go to (R). Yes, already in 19th century (and even earlier) people
paid attention to precision of measurements, errors and so on. How-
ever(!), they did not understand the fundamental role of discreteness
of information that could be obtained from measurements. Suppose
you asked an engineer of 19th century: ”Is it possible to measure the
length of this stick with arbitrary precision in finite time?” The an-
swer would be: ”In principle yes. If we use a very good measurement
device, we could do this.” So for him the problem was just of a tech-
nical matter: we need to improve technology, produce a good device
and perform the precise measurement.
Andrei: I am not sure that an engineer of 19th century would
behave in such a way. First of all as an engineer he should speak
about a measurement with an arbitrary precision, instead of a precise
measurement. Moreover, I think that he even would not claim that
there exists a kind of ”real” length of a stick. On the other hand, it
seems that you are right regarding to mathematicians and physicists.
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In 19th century they were under great influence of Newtonian model
of reality that was based on the use of ”continuous quantities” (rep-
resented by real numbers in a mathematical model). So it might be
that discreteness was surprising for people working with real model
of space-time. From this point of view the (D)-argument is just an
argument against the use of the mathematical model of physical real-
ity based on real numbers. However, quantum theory did not proceed
in this way: the Newtonian ”continuous” space-time was transferred
automatically into quantum formalism. So the (D)-argument was not
so intriguing for experimenters and engineers; it was surprising for
mathematicians and physicists working in the continuous Newtonian
model. However, in the latter case the (D)-argument did not induce
a revolution against the use of continuous quantities in physics - real
numbers. It just modifies the formalism (by using matrices) to com-
bine discreteness of results of measurements with ”continuous” reality.
Johann: Well, I take this already as an important lesson. Observa-
tion gives discrete and finite results, but the reality which we construe
from it is left continuous. This is a hint that the reality we can speak
about, is the one construed from observations. It is a picture. I think
in classical physics we were not forced so rigorously to distinguish be-
tween observed data and what we envision from them. Somehow we
could think that the data ”are” the world.
Now - randomness. There is a crucial difference between random-
ness in classical statistical physics and quantum physics. Classical
randomness is the result of our non sufficient knowledge of objective
properties of physical systems. In classical physics you were permit-
ted to think that each classical particle has a definite position at each
instant of time. In principle (at least by improving technology) we
could find the precise position of a particle. We could not do this for
a quantum particle, without strongly influencing its future behaviour.
This implies that, the image of a particle as a small something that
moves through space, cannot be upheld.
Andrei: So we could not use the classical probability theory that
was used in ”classical” statistical physics? Just to consider a large
ensemble of quantum particles, perform statistical measurement of
their properties and find corresponding probabilities and averages?
Johann: No, we could not do this! Classical randomness is, in prin-
ciple, reducible to deterministic objective realistic description. Quan-
tum stochasticity has a fundamental irreducible character.
Andrei: So classical Ensemble Probability could not work for en-
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sembles of quantum systems?
Johann: No it would not. You need to work with the complex prob-
ability amplitudes of quantum theory. This has been established in
very many experiments. The very working of semiconductor gadgets,
to take just one example, is a consequence of electrons following quan-
tum probability rules, not classical rules. [Or take everyday chemistry,
like paints and detergents. If you want to understand why they work
as they do, you will not be able to do this with classical probabil-
ity applied to electrons and ions. This is sometimes overlooked when
people introduce hidden variable models.
Andrei: What is the origin of such a difference in random behaviour
of classical and quantum particles? Do you think (as many) that there
is Something very special in quantum systems that produces special
quantum probability?
Johann: Yes, I think so.
Andrei: What is this speciality of quantum particles? It may be
their wave features?
Johann: I am hesitant to use pictures like wave or particle. Al-
though I do it all the time in the laboratory and when explaining
to students, one must be aware that notions of wave, particle and
the like are naive projections of our very muscular human experiences
onto the world. Although I have recorded ”waves” in the form of sinu-
soidal interference patterns and seen ”particles” as flashing spots on
a screen, I think it is wrong to attribute ”existence” to waves or par-
ticles. Quantum physics forces us to recognize that the world simply
does not have a ”mode of being” such and such. The question what
something ”really” is, is ill-formulated.
Andrei: I also think that the questions of existence and reality are
very important in this discussion. However, I am not sure that these
problems are only related to quantum systems. Existence of classical,
microscopic, objects is not ABSOLUTE. It seems that the table in this
room ”exists” only for a special class of observers (including human
beings). These observers ”create” the table by using their special
measurement devices. An observer of the size of an electron or the
universe would never ”create” such ”an element of reality”, table.
Johann: From a practical point of view you may be right. But I
would argue that any observer, equipped with similar reasoning pow-
ers as you and I, could find the same invariants and thus the same
structure, when given the observational data which you and I have,
and from which we conclude that the particular set of invariants is best
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subsumed under the notion ”massive impenetrable table”. (Inciden-
tally your data and mine are completely different and yet we believe
to be talking about the same table.)
Andrei: I think that the crucial role in creation of elements of re-
ality for a special class of observers plays the relative magnitude of
perturbations that are produced by measurement devices. I still have
the idea that there is not such a large difference between ”classical”
statistical physics and quantum physics. These two classes of mea-
surements are characterized by different magnitudes of perturbations
produced by measurement devices. ”Quantum” systems are essen-
tially more sensitive to perturbations of our macro-devices than ”clas-
sical” systems. Do you agree with such a viewpoint? Negligibly small
perturbations - classical physics, relatively large - quantum. It might
be that there exist some classes of perturbations that are described
neither by quantum nor classical physics.
Johann: No, I cannot follow you here. First, I am uneasy with the
term ’perturbation’. It creates the classical image of one object hitting
another one, and this is a very muscular view. C.F.von Weizsaecker
once said ”Hitting and tossing are not primitive notions of physics.” I
agree with him. I would even say that terms like ’scattering’ or ’inter-
action’ will meet with scrutiny in the future. They are also remnants
of classical muscular physical thinking. They guide the psychology,
which sets the frame for our thinking, in the wrong direction. Aside
from that, I think physics can permit only one fundamental descrip-
tion of phenomena. Today this is quantum theory. At a coarser level
you will, of course, recover the laws of classical physics. But this
will always be understandable as a washing out of interference ef-
fects, for instance, when a detector integrates over several interference
fringes because they are so narrow, or as uncontrollable interaction
and thus entanglement with the greater environment, so that classical
probability rules are sufficient to describe what you observe. For prac-
tical purposes it may be justified to distinguish between microworld
- macroworld. But one cannot see this as a limited applicability of
quantum theory.
Andrei: Well, it seems that you as well as I identified classical
physics (Newtonian or Maxwellian) physics and classical randomness
(ENSEMBLE randomness). I agree with you that we could not use
Newtonian picture of physical reality. I even do not claim that quan-
tum particles are really particles, i.e., objects localized in the Eu-
clidean or Minkowski space. These are some objects, ”somethings”.
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The only thing that I defend is that there is no statistical difference
between measurements over ensembles of ”classical” and ”quantum”
somethings. These are collections of somethings that have some inter-
nal (well, objective) properties. We perform measurements of these
properties. However, our measurements produce perturbations. This
is the origin of randomness, both classical and quantum? Of course,
quantum and classical measurements are characterized by different
magnitudes of perturbations. But it is not a consequence of an ex-
otic quantum features. It is just a question of scaling. An observer
who has the size of the universe would produce perturbations of quan-
tum magnitude by performing a measurement over an ensemble of our
tables.
Johann: No, the different statistical behavior of ’quantum objects’,
if you permit this term, cannot be reproduced by classical behavior,
e.g., when a particle is in a superposition of two different energy states,
unless you are willing to introduce an exotic entity like Bohm’s quan-
tum potential, which violates special relativity left and right. More-
over, as I just said, I do not like your notion of perturbations. Newto-
nian physics could not be used in a quantum framework, and notions
like forces and perturbations seem to me to be a hindrance. Unless
one employs them in the subtle manner as Feynman did: You can
think classically, follow each particle through all its conceivable paths,
but assign each path a probability AMPLITUDE, not a probability.
The immediate question -Why the probability AMPLITUDE? - has
no satisfactory explanation until this day, except for symmetry argu-
ments.
Andrei: Are you against my picture of classical+quantum random-
ness as perturbation-randomness?
Johann: At least your notion of perturbation is not well defined.
Andrei. I agree with you that I have to be more precise with per-
turbations. I do not consider perturbations as force-like Newtonian
perturbations. I am not interested in underlining dynamical model.
I speak about Statistical perturbations - perturbations of probability
distributions. There are some parameters that determine experimen-
tal framework, we can say context (the system of physical conditions).
It is natural that by varying these parameters we should change con-
text. Physical systems (if you like somethings) would react in a new
way to context corresponding to perturbed parameters. We obtain a
perturbation of probability distribution. Such a perturbation could be
defined in mathematical terms, see [1]. Suppose that small variations
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of contex-parameters produce negligible perturbations of probabilistic
distributions. We call such experiments - classical. Suppose that small
variations of contex-parameters produce non-negligible perturbations
of probabilistic distributions. Such a situation we have (in particular,
see [1]) in quantum experiments.
Johann: My first reaction would be ’No’. On second thought it
seems to me that you are aiming at a new language of speaking about
the quantum mechanical time evolution of a system. Not as a continu-
ous transformation of a distribution of probability amplitudes, but as
a transformation of probabilities. Isn’t the Bohmian picture just that?
I am doubtful of the advantage of the distinction ’small perturbation
= classical probability’ and ’large perturbation = quantum probabil-
ity’. If you think it through for actual situations, e.g. the double slit
experiment with objects of very small and of very large de Broglie
wavelength, you may obtain an understanding of what you mean by
’perturbation’. This could be interesting. Although I am sceptical
that a deeper explanation of ’why the quantum probability rule?’ can
be achieved, I am ready to learn. But how about the superposition
of alternatives as in the EPR-experiment or the GHZ-experiment?
Would perturbation be scaled by how much random spin flip there is?
Then you would have the opposite of what you want: No perturbation
= quantum probability, large perturbation = classical probability.
[Andrei: The EPR experiment (as well as GHZ are, in fact, ex-
periments on combination of statistical data obtained for distinct
complexes of physical conditions, contexts. EPR-contexts are deter-
mined by different settings of Stern-Gerlach devices. Here variation
of context-parameters, namely parameters of Stern-Gerlach devices,
produces non-negligible perturbations. In fact, Bell’s inequality is a
kind of constraint restricting statistical variations due to variations of
context parameters, see [].
Johann: OK, I see what you mean. The term ’perturbation’ tends
to lead me astray. It conjures up a ’hitting-tossing’ image.
Andrei. Recently I read Einstein’s papers on blackbody radiation
and photoelectric effect. First of all I was surprised by clearness of pre-
sentation of ideas (especially, compare to Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac). So
Einstein derived ”quantum probabilistic distributions” by using meth-
ods of classical statistical physics. These were the standard statistical
manipulations with ensembles of particles + discreteness. However,
the (D)-argument does not look so non classical. OK, discrete values,
but ordinary probability?
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Johann: In hindsight I would say that Einstein got the right result,
because superposition of different number states of the electromag-
netic field did not play a role in the problem. If it had, as for instance
for a field in a cavity consisting of a superposition of a 4-photon and
a 5-photon state and the question is what phase shift will an atom
pick up when it passes through, he would probably have insisted that
there are either really 4 photons or really 5 photons in the cavity, if I
apply the reasoning he used in the EPR-paper. This would have led
to the wrong phase shift for the atom.
Andrei: Do you think that Einstein obtained ”quantum proba-
bilistic distributions” just accidentally? Did he miss the superposition
features of quantum systems just by accident?
Johann: Yes, it seems so...
Andrei: I think that you would agree that in each particular quan-
tum experiment, as a measurement of some fixed physical observable,
we get classical statistical data and we operate with this data in the
same way as with the statistical data obtained in classical experiments.
It seems that the crucial probabilistic difference between classical and
quantum is demonstrated in the interference experiments. Let us con-
sider the two slit experiment. As I understood, we both do not try
to reduce the problem to wave description. For you: a particle passes
just one slit (when both are open) or in some way both slits?
Johann: First, I agree, that any quantum experiment of fixed
conditions gives data which follow a well known classical probabil-
ity distribution: binomial, multinomial, Poissonian. The problem of
understanding arises when you try to make sense of several such ex-
periments in which one or several parameters have been changed, and
you attempt a classical visualization of ’what the particle(s) did’. As
to the double slit experiment, it is clear that the particle picks up
information (=transformation of probability amplitude) along BOTH
paths and this determines the probability where it will end up on the
screen. But again, I am doubtful of this imagery. Because, any at-
tempt of verifying where the particle went changes the experimental
condition to such a degree, that interference vanishes (here you have
a case of ’strong perturbation = classical probability’). The informa-
tion, where the particle went, must be principally nonexistent in the
universe, then you get (maximum) interference. Now, if this informa-
tion is nowhere available, what sense does it make to stubbornly hold
on to the picture ’but it must have gone somewhere’? I take this les-
son to mean that the old and taken-for-granted view of the everyday
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world, which we think to be well defined and always there, is wrong
and untenable. That, what is there, is of a lot more abstract nature.
Personally, I tend towards information as the new key concept. But
not information about ’things’. Information about possible values of
properties, and sets of properties, which are not there ’by themselves’,
but which WE define on the basis of symmetries. Which is almost
as good as saying they are there ’by themselves’, because the kind of
symmetries we can think of to categorize observations is not our free
invention, but is determined by the laws of thought. And these are
definitely not our own creation, but are structures which we run up
against in our minds.
Andrei: I am not against reality as information reality. We can
consider quantum as well as classical objects as just collections of
information. There exist objective laws of evolution and interaction
of information; in particular, the laws of thought.
Johann: I would not use a mechanical idea like ’information inter-
action’, otherwise I agree.
Andrei: Well, we turn back to probability. I consider interference
(classical as well as quantum) as ”interference” of two contexts or two
alternatives. The two slit experiment for one fixed experimental set-
ting, i.e. both slits are open, could not demonstrate special ”quantum
features.” Interference fringes by themselves are not exhibitions of spe-
cial quantum nature. For instance, we can get interference patterns
in the following classical variant of the two slit experiment.
Charged macroscopic bodies move through charged screen having
two slits. We get a complex interference like distribution of bodies on
the registration screen. What is the root of this interference? The
special character of interaction between charged bodies and charged
surface of the first screen. Of course, in quantum two slit experiment
we do not have such internal (Newtonian) description of interaction
between a particle and the screen; at least in the conventional quantum
formalism. There is no quantum charge... However, we could use, for
example, Bohmian mechanics (pilot wave formalism) with its quantum
potential or quantum field given by the wave function.
Johann: Yes, you can get such periodic-looking classical parti-
cle scattering patterns in certain classical experiments. But this has
nothing to do with quantum interference. As to Bohmian mechanics, I
view this as a perhaps desparate attempt to save our classical intuitive
pictures. What I criticize is that it misses the message of quantum
theory, which is similar to the message of special and general relativ-
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ity theory. Namely that, our classical intuition, in which the world is
made up of distinct things, which exercise forces on each other, and all
this happens in a well-set three-dimensional expanse, is simply wrong.
I read the message nature gives us in these theories as: ”Thou shallst
not make an image of mine!”, a warning, which is probably already
in the Old Testament. If we teach students the Bohmian mechanics,
we may help them in the first few steps into quantum theory, but the
damage we do by distracting them from wider schemes of thought is
in the long run much greater. Today there exist computer programs
which let you view the temporal evolution of the probability density
obtained from the Schro¨dinger equation for one or several particles
for many different Hamiltonians. This can help to form a new kind of
intuition.
Andrei: In fact, I do not claim the Bohmian mechanics provides
the right internal description of quantum phenomena. But at least
this is one of possible models.
Johann: Models are certainly needed to do practical research. But
I would emphasize seeking in data the symmetries, sets of symmetries,
sets of sets of symmetries, and so on.
Andrei: We now turn back to the quantum two slit experiment. So
interference by itself is not the crucial exhibition of QUANTUM. Trou-
bles with classical picture, in fact, classical probability, start when we
play with a few experimental settings (contexts) in the two slit exper-
iment: (C12) both slits open; (C1) only the first slit is open; (C2) only
the second slit is open. If we add probabilities obtained for contexts
(C1) and (C2) we do not get the probability for the context (C12).
Classical rule for the addition of probabilities of two alternatives (first
or second slit):
P = P1 + P2. (1)
is violated. In experiments we get so called quantum rule for addition
of probabilities:
P = P1 + P2 + 2
√
P1P2 cos θ. (2)
Many people consider this fact as the real trouble with classical prob-
ability. They start to think that there is something wrong with the
image of electron passing through both slits. Moreover, this is the
root of the wave approach to quantum mechanics.
However, we will be in trouble only if we forget about perturba-
tion of probabilistic distributions induced by the transition from one
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context to others. In fact, there are three different contexts that are
involved in the consideration: (C12) and (C1), (C2). ”Quantum sys-
tems” are sensitive to variations of context parameters; in our case:
opening and closing of slits. For ”quantum systems” the complex of
physical conditions (C12) differs strongly from complexes (C1) and
(C2). In fact, (2) is just the transformation that connects probability
distributions related to different contexts. The classical rule (1) was
derived for the fixed context - in conventional axiomatics of probabil-
ity theory, Kolmogorov, 1933. Thus if we control context dependence
in the right way, then we shall not obtain any contradiction between
quantum statistical data and classical Kolmogorov probability theory.
The main problem in the right probabilistic understanding of quantum
statistical experiments is that people try to apply theory of probabil-
ity that was developed for one fixed context to statistical data obtain
in a few different contexts.
Johann: When you speak of contexts rather than perturbation, I
can follow you more easily. Because then you sound like Niels Bohr,
who insisted that the whole experimental arrangement determines the
probability distribution for the possible outcomes. He is absolutely
right, if you consider that the slightest change in the experiment must
be entered as a corresponding change in the Hamiltonian which goes
into the Schro¨dinger equation.
As to the Kolmogorovian axioms of probability theory, you seem
to imply that quantum theory does not contradict them. I agree with
you. The particle was sent onto a diaphragm with two slits and later
ended up at some point on the screen. This is only one event, ob-
served under one context, not an event that can have happened under
two different contexts. This is not possible. Any given experimental
situation is always only one context. Nevertheless, the task remains,
how to explain the existence of a lawful relation between the prob-
abilities observed in the three different contexts. (And jokingly one
might ask, why should two contexts suffice to tell us something about
a third? Perhaps it takes three, to fully predict the outcomes under
a fourth? Then we would need a three-slit experiment to capture the
whole mystery of quantum physics.)
I have a way of viewing this, which is based on the idea that, more
observations shall permit more accurate predictions. This is a natural
assumption for an experimenter. But it leads to strong constraints
on how the probabilities observed under two different contexts can
functionally be related to the probabilities found under a third one.
In the two-slit case it means that, if you measure the probabilities
for the particle to arrive at a particular spot on the screen in two
different contexts, you should be able to predict the probability, or at
least a function of it, under the third context ever more accurately,
the more trials you have done to measure the first two. If you follow
this through, you get a real and a complex way of describing this,
and the latter is the quantum theoretical rule. But you do not get
the classical rule [2]. For this reason I am interested in questions
like ”Which theory permits the most accurate predictions from the
information that is factually available now?” as an entry point to
understanding quantum theory.
Maybe I can comment a little more on the relation between clas-
sical and quantum probabilistic behavior. I think at bottom there
is only quantum probability. Classical probabilistic behavior appears
because one does not look closely, and so collects ’dirty’ facts, either
by not controlling the context sufficiently, so that the observed data
are actually collected under many different contexts, or by resolving
the measurement results with insufficient fine grading. Let us take the
double slit experiment again. If you do this experiment with an en-
semble of particles which do not all have the same energy, but a wide
spread of energies, the probability distribution on the screen will look
very much as if you had used classical particles of the same wide en-
ergy distribution. So you have actually averaged over many different
contexts, because every specific energy requires a different preparation
context. On the other hand, insufficient fine grading of the measure-
ment would mean, that you have interference fringes on the screen,
which are narrower than the grains of the emulsion of the photographic
plate, or the size of the individual pixels, if you use a modern digital
array chip as detection screen. I have no doubt that all phenomena ob-
served in classical probabilistic physics can be traced back to ’sloppy’
context definition and ’sloppy’ data registration, and mostly to a com-
bination of both. And the probability rule P1 + P2 = P12 works there
only, because the sloppiness of experimentation is compensated with a
really wrong application of the notion of ’event’, as it appears in Kol-
mogorov’s third axiom. Of course, in classical physics both mistakes
were done unknowingly. I consider it an accident that the classical
rule works in the everyday world, rather than a self-evident truth.
Andrei: It seems to me that in fact the discovery of quantum for-
malism was merely a discovery in probability theory and not really
in physics. Quantum formalism, at least Hilbert space calculus, is
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a new mathematical theory to work with statistical data belonging
to a few different contexts. Moreover, it was discovered that non-
linear probabilistic transformation (2) can be represented as a linear
transformation (for square roots of probabilities) in a complex Hilbert
space. Typically the main attention is paid to this Hilbert space cal-
culus. But I think that the crucial point was the derivation (at the
beginning purely experimental) of transformation (2) connecting prob-
abilities with respect to three different contexts. In fact, linear algebra
can be easily derived from this transformation. Everybody familiar
with the elementary geometry will see that (2) just the well known
cos-theorem. This is the rule to find the third side in a triangle if we
know lengths of two other sides and the angle θ between them:
c
2 = a2 + b2 − 2ab cos θ .
or if we want to have ”+” before cos we use so called parallelogram
law:
c
2 = a2 + b2 + 2ab cos θ . (3)
Here c is the diagonal of the parallelogram with sides a and b and the
angle θ between these sides. Of course, the parallelogram law is just
the law of linear (two dimensional Hilbert space) algebra: for finding
the length c of the sum c of vectors a and b having lengths a and b
and the angle θ between them.
Johann: I would disagree with the statement that the quantum
formalism was not a discovery in physics. As I said before, it implied
a big change in our approach to understanding the world and we have
not yet fully explored all consequences. But I can agree with you on
Hilbert space as a new tool for dealing with statistical data.
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